The CIA's Greatest Covert Operation by David H. Sharp

Author:David H. Sharp
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: University Press of Kansas
Published: 2016-01-29T05:00:00+00:00

Day 22 (Thursday, July 11, 1974)

Ironically, just when we finally had the capture vehicle and all systems ready to begin descent, the weather turned bad on us. The 0900 forecast for thirty-six hours ahead called for seaways from seven to nine feet high, swell from four to seven feet, and fifteen to twenty-five knots of wind. The seventy-two-hour forecast called for heavy rain, fifteen to thirty knots of wind, and nine to twelve feet of combined sea height. The fog was thick and continuous. Visibility was down to one-quarter mile, and the ship’s fog whistle was being sounded continuously.

Although the wave height on this day was within the limits for an undocking operation, the prospect of getting combined sea heights of up to twelve feet for the thirty-six- to seventy-two-hour period ahead of us was scary. Sea heights of that magnitude could produce ship roll angles of five degrees or more with no weight suspended from the derrick. The 2,000-ton capture vehicle and additional lift pipe that would be suspended from the lifting yokes—about 100 feet above the ship’s center of buoyancy—after undocking would have an additional influence on roll by raising the center of gravity (CG) of the ship and reducing the roll stiffness. Since the derrick gimbals would only permit roll motions of up to ±8.5 degrees and pitch motions up to ±5.0 degrees (beyond which bending moments would be inserted directly into the lift pipe), we were very reluctant to see how close to the envelope we could push things. We decided to hold, with the docking legs lowered to 105 feet, until the anticipated storm had passed.

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Bear in mind that in 1974 a seventy-two-hour forecast was little more than an educated guess. The Navy’s Fleet Numerical Weather Central (FNWC) in Monterey, California, had the best weather prediction capability in the world, and they had already made some great strides in the direction of computer-based weather prediction models. Still, by their own estimation at the time, a three-day forecast had only about a 50/50 chance of being right.

On the ship, we were still leaning heavily on the recommendations of our own onboard meteorologist whom FNWC had helped us select. We had used several meteorologists during the sea trials and IST and found only one who was willing to go out on a limb and make a seventy-two-hour forecast that might differ from an FNWC computer-generated prediction. He was a retired Navy officer, Dick Gilmartin, who had been trained at FNWC. We decided that Gilmartin was the guy we wanted on the mission and we were lucky enough to get him. On several occasions, FNWC cabled the ship voicing strong disagreement with Gilmartin’s prediction. Our man stuck to his guns. He had a great forecasting record for the entire mission, and the recovery crew considered him one of the most valuable members of the team.

On one occasion, I saw Gilmartin walking out of the weather room shaking his head, obviously disturbed. I asked him if he had a problem I should know about.

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